Abstract: 

Three recent studies [1–3], inspired by seminal work with human infants (e.g., [4]), have shown that non-human apes and macaques pass anticipatory-looking (AL) false-belief (FB) tests. These results raise the possibility that both apes and monkeys understand that others’ actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. In response, Horschler et al. [5] argued that these findings ‘should be interpreted cautiously due to methodological and theoretical challenges paralleling trends in the human literature.’ We agree that continued work is necessary to identify factors that influence reproducibility of AL paradigms and also to specify the mechanisms and functions of the observed behaviors in primates.

Abstract:

In Horschler et al. [1], we reviewed three new anticipatory looking (AL) studies of false belief (FB) representation in non-human primates (hereafter primates) [2–4] in relation to similar studies in humans [5]. We concluded that AL evidence of belief representation in primates should be interpreted cautiously due to challenges shared with the human literature, as well as a large body of work previously suggesting that primates do not represent others’ beliefs. In response, Kano, Call, and Krupenye [6] argue that comparative AL studies have been more replicable in primates than in humans, that resolving discrepant findings between AL and violation of expectation (VoE) paradigms should be prioritized, and that issues related to ecological validity may partially explain the lack of evidence for belief representation in previous comparative work.

Abstract:

The ability to remember our past depends critically on the hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), but their respective roles are debated. Contrary to classic theories, recent work ( McCormick et al. ) has shown that vmPFC drives the hippocampus during memory retrieval, irrespective of how old the recalled memories are.

Abstract:

We highlight a novel brain correlate of prediction, the prediction potential (or PP), a slow negative-going potential shift preceding visual, acoustic, and spoken or written verbal stimuli that can be predicted from their context. The cortical sources underlying the prediction potential reflect perceptual and semantic features of anticipated stimuli before these appear.

Abstract:

Increasing efforts are being made to understand the role of intermittent, transient, high-power burst events of neural activity. These events have a temporal, spectral, and spatial domain. Here, we argue that considering all three domains is crucial to fully reveal the functional relevance of these events in health and disease.

Abstract:

How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals ‘more conscious’ than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested.

Abstract: 

A fundamental question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which cognitive and neural processes are specialised for social behaviour, or are shared with other ‘non-social’ cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. Here we apply the influential framework of Marr (1982) across research in humans, monkeys, and rodents to propose that information processing can be understood as ‘social’ or ‘non-social’ at different levels. We argue that processes can be socially specialised at the implementational and/or the algorithmic level, and that changing the goal of social behaviour can also change social specificity.

Abstract: 

Recent breakthroughs in neurobiology indicate that the time is ripe to understand how cellular-level mechanisms are related to conscious experience. Here, we highlight the biophysical properties of pyramidal cells, which allow them to act as gates that control the evolution of global activation patterns. In conscious states, this cellular mechanism enables complex sustained dynamics within the thalamocortical system, whereas during unconscious states, such signal propagation is prohibited. We suggest that the hallmark of conscious processing is the flexible integration of bottom-up and top-down data streams at the cellular level.

Abstract: 

Is consciousness a continuous stream of percepts or is it discrete, occurring only at certain moments in time? This question has puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists for centuries. Both hypotheses have fallen repeatedly in and out of favor. Here, we review recent studies exploring long-lasting postdictive effects and show that the results favor a two-stage discrete model, in which substantial periods of continuous unconscious processing precede discrete conscious percepts. We propose that such a model marries the advantages of both continuous and discrete models and resolves centuries old debates about perception and consciousness.